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Robert A. Hillman and Maureen A. O’Rourke

Law and Technology
Principles of the Law
of Software Contracts
An overview of a new set of legal principles for software
contracts developed by the American Law Institute.

I

as in many
countries, the software industry
is increasingly important. Proprietary and open source software powers items as diverse
as PCs and refrigerators, and controls
systems as vital as missile defense and
the utility grid. Many software vendors’
principle source of revenue comes from
licensing their code to businesses and/
or consumers. Others use software as
a means to drive demand for another
money-making product like services. In
any event, no one seriously questions
software’s place in the economy or its
importance to modern life. It may be
somewhat surprising then that the law
of software transactions in the U.S. has
not been uniform. In Europe, European Union directives,a such as Council
Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009
on the legal protection of computer
programs (EU Directive) (replacing the
former directive from 1991), helpfully
set forth basic principles. In the U.S.,
courts look to the common law of contract (that is, the decisions of courts) or
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
(a statute enacted by each state) for the
rule of decision, and must also consider other sources such as consumer
protection law and federal intellectual
property law. Contract law and consumer protection law can vary by state and
n the United States

a EU directives consist of legislation that direct member states to promulgate rules
to realize a particular goal. See Wikipedia,
available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directive_(European_Union)
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Software’s unique
attributes and
importance to
the economy make
legal uniformity and
clarity particularly
important.

interpretations of the UCC and federal
law can also be inconsistent. Although
this variation characterizes the U.S. approach to much of its law, software’s
unique attributes and importance to
the economy make legal uniformity
and clarity particularly important.
Against this background, the American Law Institute (ALI), a law-reform
organization in the U.S.,b undertook a
project to analyze the area of software
contracting and to set forth principles
that a court could adopt as the rule of
decision in a case before it. This effort
produced the Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts, a volume that we
drafted and that underwent extensive
review over a five-year period. The Prinb For information about the ALI, see, see http://
www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.
overview
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ciples address a set of topics important to software transactions—some
unique to the software context, others
not. We discuss briefly here just a few
of the more important or controversial
provisions and recommend that interested readers refer to the complete
work for more information.
Scope
The first question the Principles faced
was how to define the transactions to
which they applied. The Principles intentionally define their scope narrowly
to software as traditionally understood.
As drafters, we understood the danger
of over-inclusiveness: In particular, we
wished to avoid the trap of including
all types of digital information within
our project’s scope. As a result, digital
media and digital databases are not
part of the project.
Even with this narrow approach,
questions remained. The Free Software Foundation, at least until the
release of Version 3.0 of the General
Public License (GPL), maintained that
open source licenses akin to the GPL
were not contracts under U.S. law,
but rather were mere copyright permissions. We disagreed, arguing that
under U.S. law as traditionally understood, most open source licenses are
indeed contracts because they are in
the nature of an exchange between
the provider and user. The Principles
therefore apply to open source agreements with exceptions and specific
provisions where necessary.
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Relationship to Intellectual
Property Law, Public Policy,
and Unconscionability
In the U.S., software agreements as consensual transactions implicate contract
law, which is primarily the province of
the states. Software, of course, can be
protected by federal intellectual property rights, including copyright and patent. Questions can arise whether a state
court may enforce provisions under its
contract law that provide greater rights
or restrict limitations that federal intellectual property law would grant in the
absence of the parties’ agreement.
Here, as in many areas, the Prin-

The Principles opt
to direct courts to
consider all facts
and circumstances,
rather than adopting
a blanket rule.

ciples take the general position that
parties are free to contract as they see
fit. The Principles, however, note that
courts must be particularly attentive
to provisions affecting federal intellectual property rights in the case of
boilerplate standard forms. Especially
because of the take-it-or-leave-it nature
of such forms and the tendency of consumers and others to fail to read them,
the federal interest in state non-interference with the intellectual property
system is at its height.
For example, many boilerplate
agreements include a provision against
reverse engineering. Under both the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) and the EU Directive, such provisions are unenforceable
in certain circumstances.c However,
the Principles opt to direct courts to

consider all facts and circumstances,
including whether the ban on reverse
engineering is in a standard form, rather than adopting a blanket rule.
Many legal doctrines in the U.S. take
a similar contextual approach. Some
police contractual provisions for fairness in their formation and substance
or for their effect on third parties. In
this regard, the Principles include sections on unconscionability and public
policy. Here again, the Principles do
not set forth a list of suspect or unenforceable terms. Instead, they take the
traditional U.S. approach of considering the context. But the Principles provide extensive comments about the nature of reasonable contract-formation
processes and the fairness of substantive terms to guide courts in their contextual approach.

c UCITA was an attempt by a private U.S. organization, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, to promulgate
a uniform law governing “information” transactions. It met with much opposition, in part
because of its perceived business orientation,
and only two states have adopted it. Generally
UCITA and the EU Directive preclude enforcement of a provision against reverse engineering if necessary to obtain information for interoperability purposes.

Implied Warranty of No
Material Hidden Defects
The Principles clarify warranty law
that has become muddled particularly
under the UCC. For example, in the
Principles, the creation of an express
warranty and whether it is disclaimed
depend respectively on whether a reasonable person could rely on the rep-
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resentation and whether a reasonable
person would be surprised by the disclaimer. One warranty provision, however, has been controversial. Section
3.05(b) provides that a party who transfers software and receives money or a
monetary obligation in return warrants
“that the software contains no material
hidden defects of which the transferor
was aware at the time of the transfer.”
Software providers objected to this
provision as inconsistent with current law and likely to increase litigation. They also believe the warranty
should be disclaimable. However,
the rule merely codifies U.S. contract
law’s duty to disclose and obligation
of good faith and tort law’s fraudulent
concealment principle. Further, the
material-hidden-defect rule should
not be difficult to administer. It defines a material defect as one that constitutes a material breach of the agreement. As such, the rule draws on the
well-rehearsed material breach doctrine of U.S. law. Additionally, a hidden defect is one the provider knows
about but would not surface upon any
testing that was or should have been
performed by the user. Disclosure of
the defect occurs when a reasonable
user would understand the existence
and nature of the defect. As the Principles point out, providers that do
not engage in concealment should
have little to fear from this rule. But
contract law should not support a
provider’s strategy to foist a product
known to be materially defective on
to a user without providing that user
with a remedy for potentially significant losses. Providers can insulate
themselves from liability by disclosing material defects in their software.
Automated Disablement
Another section that exposed conflicting views governs automated disablement. Automated disablement refers to
a provider’s use of electronic means to
disable or materially impair the functionality of software such as by building
in a “time bomb” or accessing the user’s system remotely to disable certain
software.d The Principles severely limit
d If a user accesses a provider’s software by connecting to software resident on the provider’s
system, failure of the provider to grant access
is not considered an automated disablement.
28
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firms rather than
trying to distinguish
between those that
are knowledgeable
and informed and
those that are not.

the use of automated disablement as a
remedy for breach: It is unavailable at
all in the case of a consumer transaction or a standard-form transfer of generally available software. Additionally,
the term authorizing automated disablement must appear conspicuously
in the agreement, the party seeking to
employ automated disablement must
provide notice and an opportunity to
cure to the user, and the provider must
obtain a court order before disabling
the software. These obligations are not
disclaimable and damages for their
breach may not be limited.
Particularly those software providers marketing to large, knowledgeable, well-informed commercial parties objected to the restrictions placed
on automated disablement as too
onerous and an unwarranted intrusion on freedom of contract. They also
objected to the non-disclaimable nature of the obligations and inability to
limit damages.
The commentary to the automated
disablement section recognizes both
these concerns and the historical nature of the debate. Software providers
argued that automated disablement
is necessary to prevent ongoing misuse of the software or a continuing
breach that is causing damages to accumulate without any real possibility
the provider will ever be made whole.
Users argue that breach is highly contextual and a wrongful denial of use
may cripple a business and/or harm
software not even implicated in the
dispute. Moreover, allowing providers to leave a “back door” open to
permit automated disablement pos-
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es real security risks. Automated disablement is so controversial that, as
recently as 2002, UCITA prohibited
its use.
We believe our approach to automated disablement presents a reasonable balance between the conflicting
interests. Even when commercial entities negotiate contracts, one side may
overreach. Firms using software are not
monolithic—many are small firms that
cannot afford to hire lawyers to negotiate complex provisions. These firms are
more akin to consumers than to large
businesses. It is better to provide protections to all firms rather than trying
to distinguish between those that are
knowledgeable and informed and those
that are not.
What’s Next?
The Principles, of course, contain many
other provisions, including standards
for enforcement of online contracts,
which we do not have space to discuss
here. Rather, we would simply emphasize a few points:
˲˲ The Principles were the result of a
five-year drafting process that included
input from both users and providers
of software. There were many contentious issues on which both constituencies would never agree. In such cases,
we made difficult choices informed by
the legitimate points raised by both
sides. We are not surprised the result
sometimes makes neither side happy.
˲˲ The Principles are not the law of
the U.S. or any particular state in the
U.S. One or more of their provisions
would become law if a court in a concrete case chose to adopt them as its
rule of decision.
˲˲ The Principles address both topics that are unique to software and
those that are not. Their applicability is limited to their scope. To the
extent, however, that courts or commentators find their approach useful
outside of the software context, we
would welcome their use by analogy
in other areas.
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